rules to address the preservation of ESI and sanctions for its spoliation in civil cases. 7 Currently, the trial judge has discretion to issue sanctions for spoliation. 8 However, a 2004 survey of federal and state court rulings regarding spoliation of ESI revealed that courts determined sanctions largely based on the alleged spoliator's level of culpability and the degree of prejudice suffered by the innocent party. 9 One of the more commonly issued sanctions for spoliation is an adverse-inference instruction. 10 Although it is not the harshest sanction in a court's arsenal, an adverse-inference instruction is nonetheless severe enough to end a lawsuit. 12 and Rimkus Consulting Group, Inc. v. Cammarata 13 -exemplify the split between the Second and Fifth Circuits, among others. The decisions highlight the circuits' differing opinions on two issues: (1) the allocation of the burden to prove relevance and prejudice in spoliation cases and (2) the level of culpability required for an adverse-inference instruction or sanctions of similar severity.
Two 2010 spoliation decisions-Pension Committee of University of Montreal Pension Plan v. Banc of America Securities, LLC

14
The decisions also illustrate the varying approaches to the respective roles of the judge and the jury in administering the adverse-inference instruction. 8. See supra note 3. 9. Scheindlin & Wangkeo, supra note 3, at 80. 10. See supra note 5. A court imposing an adverse-inference instruction for a party's failure to produce relevant evidence within its control will "instruct the jury that it may infer that the missing evidence is unfavorable to the party who could have produced the evidence and did not." SCHEINDLIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 422.
11. See infra Part IV. The most severe sanction for spoliation is a default judgment for the plaintiff or, if the plaintiff is the spoliator, a dismissal of the plaintiff's claims. ADAM adverse-inference instruction as a sanction for the defendant's bad-faith destruction of e-mail in an employment-discrimination action brought under the Family and Medical Leave Act. 18 Connor is useful pedagogically because the facts raise several recurring issues regarding the alleged spoliations of ESI, including: (1) when a duty to preserve evidence arises, (2) the degree of culpability required to support a violation, (3) the standard of proof an innocent party must satisfy in order to establish relevance and prejudice, (4) the court's discretion in finding spoliation and selecting an appropriate penalty, and (5) the uncertain protection from sanctions afforded by the safe-harbor provision of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e). 19 This Article discusses the unique issues involving ESI's spoliation and the sanctions that may be issued as a consequence, exemplified by the Connor opinion. Part I reviews the advent of evidentiary rules regarding ESI and goes on to explain this Article's chosen focus of examining e-discovery through the lens of a particular classroom experience with the casebook entitled Electronic Discovery and Digital Evidence (the Casebook). 20 In Part II, this Article highlights the challenges that arise when ESI is involved in the discovery process. Part III explores the primary factors that courts use when considering whether to issue sanctions for evidence spoliation. Part IV then discusses the adverse-inference instruction-a serious sanction that courts often impose. Next, the Article uses the Pension Committee and Rimkus decisions to examine the circuit split on certain spoliation issues and continues with an analysis of the pedagogical utility of Connor. Finally, in Part V, this Article summarizes the recent meetings of the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, in which the Committee has proposed rules that would govern sanctions for ESI spoliation. 19. See infra Part IV.B.1-3. Rule 37(e) provides that "[a]bsent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to provide electronically stored information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system." FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e).
20. SCHEINDLIN ET AL., supra note 1. I taught Chapter IV of the Casebook, Spoliation and Sanctions, as part of a course in complex litigation at Texas Tech University School of Law. See id. at 362-442. In seven class periods, my class of nine very capable law students discussed the principal cases and commentaries in the chapter. Each student was responsible for leading discussion on one of the principal cases after drafting a memorandum outlining his or her preparation. Class members responded by e-mail each day to three questions concerning various aspects of the assigned case: (1) the effectiveness of the case in learning about the law governing sanctions for spoliation, (2) the difficult aspects of the case, and (3) the helpful aspects of the case.
I. CHOOSING THE CHAPTER ON SPOLIATION AND SANCTIONS FOR CLASSROOM USE
Many law students, as future litigators, need to ensure they avoid spoliation and its serious consequences. The Casebook's chapter on spoliation and sanctions was chosen because it effectively introduces students to the world of e-discovery. 21 It also allows students to realize that, although one does not need to be a computer-science expert, practitioners should have a working knowledge of a party's computer operations in order to adequately address potential issues regarding ESI spoliation.
Two distinguished e-discovery experts authored the Casebook. Professor Daniel Capra is the reporter to the Advisory Committee on Evidence Rules and was the primary drafter of Rule 502 on waiver of privilege. 22 He is also the co-author of a five-volume treatise on evidence. 23 Judge Scheindlin served from 1998 to 2005 on the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules and the Discovery Subcommittee that drafted the 2006 amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which focused on e-discovery. 24 The new rules recognized the shift from paper to digital records and specifically addressed ESI in the discovery process. 25 Judge Scheindlin also wrote the series of landmark opinions in Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC, in which she took an approach to e-discovery broadly consistent with the approach later taken by the Advisory Committee in the amended rules.
26
In addition to the Zubulake opinions, Judge Scheindlin authored the 2010 opinion in Pension Committee, which she subtitled Zubulake Revisited: Six Years Later. 27 In it, she summarized much of the law relating to "litigation holds" and sanctioned several plaintiffs with an adverse-inference instruction for grossly negligent collection and preservation of ESI. 28 The decision is significant because it provides a legal framework for determining the appropriateness of sanctions for unintentional acts of spoliation. 29 Further, it furnishes a series of examples of discovery misconduct, which may constitute either ordinary or gross negligence in a party's implementation of a litigation hold.
30
The Casebook was so much the product of collaborative effort that the editors designated the Sedona Conference (Sedona) as a third co-author. 31 Sedona is a law and policy institute comprised of leading judges, lawyers, academics, and technology consultants who are extremely knowledgeable on matters involving e-discovery. 32 Through its development of a set of widely cited e-discovery publications, 33 Sedona has been a primary source of guidance for judges, counsel, and clients facing novel issues in this area. 
34
Professor Marcus provides an overview of the evolution of e-discovery and describes the momentous changes in American discovery practices over the past quarter-century, referring particularly to rulemaking efforts to contain overbroad discovery and, most recently, to explicitly address ESI. 35 In doing so, he explains why e-discovery deserves separate attention in the rules.
36
Although the Casebook focuses almost entirely on federal e-discovery rules, Professor Marcus notes that ESI issues also arise in state courts, many of which have adopted e-discovery rules modeled after the federal rules.
37
Today's law students, knowledgeable in the use of computers, will be buoyed by Professor Marcus's remark that, as "products of the first digital generation," they may be better equipped as future lawyers and judges to deal with ESI than present-day lawyers. 38 For those who are less technologically savvy, the Advisory Committee Note to Rule 26(f) provides an important cautionary message. 39 The Note warns that lawyers must develop an understanding of their clients' computer systems in order to effectively perform their duties under the new rules.
40
For example, Rule 26(f) requires counsel to confer to address issues relating to the preservation of discoverable information and the form in which any ESI should be produced. 41 Additionally, a lawyer must monitor his or her client's 34. Marcus, supra note 1, at 1 n. 42 To perform these duties, counsel must consult the "key players" with access to the ESI to learn how the client stores e-data, the client's information technology (IT) staff to understand the client's IT infrastructure and policies, and possibly outside computer experts for general assistance. 43 A cottage industry of electronic consultants has emerged to assist lawyers and parties in meeting their e-discovery obligations. 44 This industry generates billions of dollars annually, demonstrating the cost, complexity, and prevalence of e-discovery in American litigation. 45 II. THE CHALLENGES TO AMERICAN DISCOVERY IN A DIGITAL ERA Law students should be eager to study e-discovery. The Advisory Committee explained that the sheer volume of ESI required new rules to govern its preservation and production. 46 Electronic information is now the dominant form of business information, in part, because the costs of storing electronic data are far less than storing a comparable amount of paper records.
47
Questions arise about the appropriate storage media, length of retention, procedures for retrieval, extent of discoverability, and production format. 48 The Committee noted that electronic data is dynamic, unlike paper documents, because its content may change with or without human intervention. 49 Simply opening a document can alter earlier information.
50 electronic discovery issues, should they be precluded from raising any later identified electronic discovery problems as the basis for a discovery motion? SCHEINDLIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 199 Additionally, deleting ESI is more difficult than paper documents because deletion does not physically remove the information from a hard drive. 51 Rather, deletion frees up the space for other uses, but the deleted data may be retrievable if it has not been overwritten or otherwise wiped from the hard drive.
52 Deleted data could also be found on network backup tapes, which are used generally for disaster recovery.
53
Restoration of such tapes can be difficult and costly, however, because the information is often difficult to access and tapes are recycled periodically, resulting in loss of data.
54
The Advisory Committee recognized the challenges attorneys faced under the old rules when reviewing ESI for privileged information. 55 When producing discovery, a party must ensure that privileged communications are not disclosed in order to avoid waiver of privilege. 56 Before the adoption of Federal Rule of Evidence 502 in 2008, an inadvertent disclosure of information could have resulted in a waiver of privilege even if the attorney took reasonable steps to prevent such a disclosure. 57 Rule 502 clarified the matter by providing a uniform federal test for adjudicating claims of waiver through inadvertent production: inadvertent disclosure will not waive privilege if the privilege holder took reasonable steps both to prevent disclosure and to rectify the error.
58
Before a party can review ESI for privileged information, the data must be located and retrieved-a process often complicated by multiple storage locations, high volume, and unhelpful records-management policies. 59 After retrieval, the data may require restoration to be accessible, which can be a costly and time-consuming endeavor. 60 Lawyers could benefit by enlisting e-discovery consultants to assist in the retrieval, restoration, and review processes. 61 The associated costs can be enormous, however, when the matter involves vast amounts of ESI. In 2000, one commentator warned that e-discovery presents challenges distinct from paper-based discovery. 63 First, e-discovery can include a greater volume of data. 64 Second, ESI can be stored on a wide range of media, including employee laptops, desktops, home computers, network servers, and various hand-held devices. 65 Having these varied storage locations disperses the data and complicates the discovery process, increasing costs and the risk of spoliation. 66 Third, often outdated, underutilized, or nonexistent records-management practices of business organizations exacerbate discovery problems.
67 Fourth, ESI is not always destroyed as regularly as paper records once the data are unnecessary. 68 Consequently, the commingling of voluminous records often complicates the separation of potentially discoverable ESI from irrelevant records.
III. THE MAJOR DETERMINANTS OF ESI SPOLIATION: CULPABILITY AND PREJUDICE
A party seeking sanctions for spoliation must establish the following elements:
(1) that the party having control over the evidence had an obligation to preserve it at the time it was destroyed; (2) that the records were destroyed with a "culpable state of mind" and (3) that the destroyed evidence was "relevant" to the party's claim or defense such that a reasonable trier of fact could find that it would support that claim or defense.
70
The Casebook authors distilled these elements into two primary factors-culpability and prejudicial effect-the degrees of which generally determine the type of sanctions imposed. 71. SCHEINDLIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 387. Judge Scheindlin and her law clerk, Wangkeo, distilled these two factors from their study of state and federal sanctions decisions. See Scheindlin & Wangkeo, supra note 3, at 76-77 ("When courts imposed sanctions, they referred to the willfulness or bad faith of the violator (49%), prejudice to the party requesting production (35%), and/or the gross negligence or recklessness of the spoliating party (9%) as the reason(s) for imposing the sanction(s)." (footnotes omitted)).
will remedy the spoliation and deter similar conduct, and whether to impose sanctions on an innocent party for spoliation committed by an attorney.
72
In selecting an appropriate sanction for litigants or counsel liable for spoliation, a judge may choose from a variety of sanctions-some more severe than others. 73 In spite of these penalties, judges are hesitant to impose sanctions because they prefer that cases be decided on the merits. 74 Further, when judges choose to order sanctions, they tend to avoid the most severe penalties. 75 The extent of culpability and prejudice varies. Just as the wrongdoer's conduct may range from inadvertent loss of evidence to intentional and bad-faith destruction, the prejudice suffered by the innocent party might be negligible or, quite conversely, could be dispositive. 76 Additionally, courts will balance these factors against each other.
77 For example, even if a party acted with a high degree of culpability, a court would be unlikely to impose sanctions if the consequent prejudice was negligible.
78 Similarly, if a party suffered severe prejudice, but the destruction of evidence was completely inadvertent, the court would not likely impose sanctions because sanctioning requires at least some degree of culpability. 74. Id. at 11 (remarks of the Honorable Loretta A. Preska, U.S. district judge) ("First of all, the judicial system prefers to resolve controversies on the merits. Secondly, most judges don't like to sanction lawyers. Thirdly-and this is from a very selfish perspective-sanctions create a lot of extra work while not actually moving the ball toward the resolution of the case and, fourth, it is not unheard of for the Court of Appeals to reverse sanctions decisions.").
75. SCHEINDLIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 387. 76. Rimkus Consulting Group, Inc. v. Cammarata, 688 F. Supp. 2d 598, 613 (S.D. Tex. 2010). In Rimkus, the destruction of e-mail had mixed effects for the wrongdoers (defendants) as well as the innocent party (plaintiff). Id. at 607-08. Although many of the e-mails that the defendants deleted were unrecoverable, some were retrieved from other sources. Id. at 608. Of those recovered, some were adverse to the defendants, but others were favorable to them. Id. According to the court, the plaintiff was still able to obtain "extensive evidence" to support its claims and defenses despite the loss of the e-mails. Id. Balancing these competing factors, the court concluded that the reduced prejudice to the plaintiff justified an adverse-inference instruction rather than a more severe sanction, such as entering default judgment or modifying pleadings. Id.
77. See id. at 613. 78. Id.
Id.
A decision to impose sanctions can be particularly difficult in the context of e-discovery for at least two reasons. First, whether the loss or destruction of ESI occurred during the routine management of records or at the direction of a specific individual can be difficult to determine. 80 Second, restoring lost or destroyed ESI is often prohibitively expensive, further complicating the process of fashioning appropriate relief for spoliation victims.
IV. THE ADVERSE-INFERENCE INSTRUCTION
The judge alone decides whether to impose spoliation sanctions of almost every type, but the adverse-inference instruction is an exception. 82 Once the judge has decided to impose this particular sanction, the jury must decide whether a party is culpable for spoliation and whether the other party would have benefitted from the evidence so spoliated. 83 Adverse-inference instructions are also distinct from other sanctions because the alleged spoliator may introduce evidence at trial to re-argue the spoliation issue. 84 In some cases, the judge will determine culpability and permit the jury to presume prejudice, whereas in others, the judge will present both issues as questions of fact for the jury to decide. 85 Regardless of whether a legal presumption exists and whether the judge or the jury finds spoliation, the jury decides whether to presume the evidence was adverse to the wrongdoer. 86 Unlike the most severe sanctions, such as default judgment and dismissal of claims or defenses, the adverse-inference instruction does not formally end litigation. Nonetheless, courts properly describe it as an extreme sanction 80. COHEN & LENDER, supra note 11, § 3.08 [D] ("The how, when, and why of spoliation of electronic evidence can be a complicated inquiry.").
81. Id. 82. See Panel Discussion, supra note 73, at 10 (remarks of the Honorable Shira A. Scheindlin, U.S. district judge) ("Unlike all the other sanctions, when a court issues an adverse inference instruction, the court's finding of spoliation can be second-guessed by the jury.").
83. Id. ("Although the court has already found that a party caused evidence to be lost and that a sanction is appropriate, the jury has to do it all over again.").
84. because in practice a decision to issue such an instruction often results in settlement before the jury is so instructed. 87 Although often referred to simply as an adverse-inference instruction, this sanction may take the form, depending on the jurisdiction, of either an inference or a presumption of the existence of key elements of spoliation. 88 Consequently, how the judge frames the instruction can significantly influence the severity of the sanction. An adverse-inference instruction is itself a severe sanction, but instructions on presumptions of spoliation can have an even greater effect on the jury for two reasons. First, presumptions operate to shift the burden of producing evidence on such issues as relevance and prejudice to the wrongdoer. 89 Second, an unopposed presumption, at least in theory, controls the jury's decision. 90 Regardless of the instruction, the offending party may introduce evidence at trial to rebut the elements of spoliation so that the jury has adequate information on which to decide if an inference or presumption is ultimately appropriate.
91
A. Two District Court Decisions Granting an Adverse-Inference Instruction
The opinions in Pension Committee and Rimkus illustrate varying approaches that courts might take when addressing the three issues surrounding an adverse-inference instruction. 92 First, the courts disagreed on the level of culpability required for an adverse-inference instruction.
93 Second, noting that "an adverse inference instruction often ends litigation" and "the party suffering the instruction will be hard-pressed to prevail on the merits"); see also Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 619-20 ("Although adverse inference instructions can take varying forms that range in harshness, and although all such instructions are less harsh than so-called terminating sanctions, they are properly viewed as among the most severe sanctions a court can administer.").
88 (granting an adverse-inference instruction when the offenders' conduct was grossly negligent), with Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 614 (noting that severe sanctions such as an adverse-inference instruction will not be imposed in the Fifth Circuit without a showing of bad faith). Courts following Pension Committee in the Second Circuit reason that each party should bear the risk of its own carelessness. See Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 615 (describing the Pension Committee opinion and its application of Second Circuit case law). Magistrate Judge James C. Francis, IV, explained that the rationale for this approach is not to punish the spoliator for carelessness but to the courts have different views on whether the innocent party must prove that the missing evidence has prejudiced its claims or defenses. 94 Third, the courts view the functions of the judge and jury in administering the adverse-inference instruction differently. 95 
Pension Committee: Presuming Relevance and Prejudice when a Party Is Grossly Negligent
In Pension Committee, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York found gross and ordinary negligence in the offenders' conduct during discovery, but found no intentional misconduct. 96 The court acknowledged that determining the level of culpability in hindsight is not an exact science and different judges could make different determinations. 97 The court found that failing to issue a timely litigation hold in writing, failing to collect or reserve any ESI three years into litigation, continuing to delete ESI after the duty to preserve arose, failing to request documents from key players, failing to supervise search efforts, destroying potentially relevant backup data, and submitting misleading information all constituted gross negligence. 98 It also stressed that a party must institute a litigation hold to suspend routine document-destruction policies and to preserve relevant documentation once that party reasonably anticipates litigation. 99 The court further explained that failure to issue such a hold in writing is grossly negligent conduct because relevant information will likely be destroyed in its absence. 94. Compare Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 467 (permitting the court to presume prejudice when the offender acted in bad faith or a grossly negligent manner), with Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 617-18 (suggesting disagreement with Pension Committee and that the innocent party must make some showing of prejudice regardless of the offender's culpability).
95. Compare Pension Comm., 685 F. Supp. 2d at 496 n.251 (explaining that although the jury is bound by the court's finding that the plaintiffs destroyed documents, the jury must determine "whether that evidence is relevant or whether its loss has caused any prejudice"), with Rimkus, 688 F. Supp. 2d at 653 (allowing the jury to hear evidence about the loss of e-mails, and instructing the jury that if it finds the defendants intentionally deleted e-mails for purposes of litigation, it may infer that the e-mails would have been adverse to defendants As a result of this gross negligence, the court gave the jury an adverse-inference instruction and permitted it to presume prejudice.
101
The Pension Committee court offered examples of conduct that might constitute ordinary negligence, such as failing to take appropriate ESI preservation measures, failing to assess search terms for accuracy and validity, and failing to gather information from each employee relevant to the litigation. 102 The court did not impose an adverse-inference instruction on the parties that it found merely negligent. 103 Rather, it sanctioned those parties with lesser penalties such as costs and attorneys fees.
104
According to the court, the severity of the adverse-inference instruction should depend on the spoliator's level of culpability. 105 Courts can set the level of security by controlling the jury's discretion with presumptions.
106
When the offender's conduct is most egregious through willful behavior or bad faith, the judge can instruct the jury that it must accept certain facts as true.
107
When the conduct is less egregious, but still willful or reckless, the judge can issue a mandatory presumption, which may be rebutted.
108
In the least egregious cases warranting an adverse-inference instruction, in which the offender acted negligently, the judge can instruct the jury that it may presume prejudice, which can then be rebutted. 109 These presumptions shift the burden to the offender to prove that the spoliated evidence is not relevant and that its loss does not prejudice the innocent party.
110
The court explained that excusing innocent parties entirely from the burden establishing evidentiary prejudice would incentivize parties to challenge even inadvertent errors, resulting in "a 'gotcha' game rather than a full and fair opportunity to air the merits of a dispute." The Rimkus court instructed the jury that, as a matter of law, the defendants had a duty to preserve certain ESI, which, unlike Pension Committee, allowed the jury to decide culpability. 117 This instruction was less severe than in Pension Committee because the jury was free to decide whether in fact the alleged offenders deleted ESI to prevent its use in anticipated litigation.
118
Under the Rimkus approach, the court only decides whether the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to find intentional destruction. 119 Thereafter, upon hearing all the evidence, the jury would be so instructed to decide whether the alleged offenders intentionally destroyed the evidence. 120 Further, the instruction directed that if the jury found intent, it could, but was not required to, infer that the missing ESI would have been detrimental to the offenders. 121 Judge Rosenthal noted that jury instructions based on presumptions and burden-shifting analyses (as in Pension Committee) are unnecessary and confusing. 122 Judge Rosenthal suggested that the principle of proportionality endorsed by the Sedona Conference should guide courts considering sanctions. The Sedona Conference suggested that "[e]lectronic discovery burdens should be proportional to the amount in controversy and the nature of the case. Otherwise, transaction costs due to electronic discovery will overwhelm the ability to resolve disputes fairly in litigation."
123 Judge Rosenthal also noted that the reasonableness of discovery efforts in Pension Committee-a $550 million case-is different than the reasonableness of discovery efforts in Rimkus, which involved a dispute over noncompetition agreements.
124
In short, the reasonableness of discovery efforts turns on whether those efforts were proportional to the facts and circumstances of the case and whether they were consistent with applicable standards. Before taking leave, the bank reassigned two of the eight employees that she managed. 127 Although she was based in Atlanta, three of the employees she managed worked in the Enterprise Publication Services (EPS) group in Orlando.
128 While Connor was on leave, one of the three in Orlando (the EPS on-site supervisor) resigned unexpectedly. 129 Connor's supervisor, Leslie Weigel, then initiated discussions with senior management, which led the bank to reassign the two remaining EPS employees to another Sun Trust department in Orlando. 130 Consequently, when the plaintiff returned in 2007, she supervised only three employees based on Atlanta.
131
Less than a month after returning, Weigel informed the plaintiff that her employment was being terminated. 132 About two weeks later, on February 12, 2007, Weigel sent an e-mail to the bank's senior management team explaining that the decision to fire the plaintiff was based on the reduction in employees that she managed. Connor then employed an attorney who, before filing suit, sent Sun Trust a letter on February 21, 2007, informing the bank of the potential for litigation and requesting that the bank preserve documents relevant to Connor's termination. 134 On February 22, the bank's in-house counsel issued preservation instructions to several employees, including Weigel, who were likely to possess potentially relevant information. 135 These employees gave the plaintiff responsive documents, but did not provide the February 12 e-mail. 136 In September of 2007, Connor obtained a copy of the e-mail by undisclosed means. 137 She contended that the e-mail supported her theory of an FMLA violation and moved, before trial, to sanction the bank for not producing it. 138 The court found that the bank's failure constituted bad-faith spoliation of evidence and sanctioned the bank with an "appropriate" inference instruction because the spoliation prejudiced the plaintiff. 139 Unfortunately, the Connor court did not discuss the form or content of its intended inference instruction.
140
Sun Trust's e-mail retention system required employees to take overt action to preserve e-mails. 141 The bank's server retained an e-mail for thirty days, after which it would be deleted automatically unless the employee had archived or deleted it previously.
142 Additionally, the bank backed up all e-mails on a daily basis for disaster-recovery purposes, but these backups were recycled every seven to ten days. 143 Thus, on February 21, when the bank received notice of potential litigation, the February 12 e-mail would have remained on the server for about twenty more days and an additional seven to ten days thereafter on the backup tapes, unless someone affirmatively deleted it beforehand. 07-CV-0650-RLV). Several of my class members said that they were somewhat confused when the opinion referred at one point to instructing on a "presumption" of spoliation and at another to instructing on an "inference" of spoliation. See Connor, 546 F. Supp. 2d at 1377. This reaction to the court's unexplained reference to both terms in its opinion is understandable. Law students know the differences between inferences and presumptions, but they likely are unfamiliar with cases like Pension Committee or Rimkus which show that inference instructions can take various forms and may refer to either or both of these evidentiary devices.
141 Weigel customarily archived her inbox and outbox on a weekly basis.
145
After she was instructed on February 22 to preserve relevant documents, she searched her archives and produced some e-mails, not including the e-mail from February 12. 146 In September 2007, after Connor obtained this particular e-mail and moved for sanctions, Weigel checked her archives again to see if she had previously missed it.
147 She discovered that she had not archived any e-mails between January 1 and February 18, 2007.
148 Consequently, all her e-mails during that period were deleted automatically after thirty days on the server (unless Weigel had deleted it earlier). 149 Sun Trust explained that Weigel's departure from her usual practice was due to the press of business.
150
As one of the most frequent means of business communication, e-mail is a rich source of discoverable information.
151 E-discovery experts have identified several qualities of e-mail communication that distinguish it from other forms of communication. 152 Oftentimes, e-mails are not edited, proofread, or reviewed.
153 Additionally, the sender may fail to understand that his or her statements are not private or secure and that his workplace statements may be attributed to his employer. 154 Thus, a sender potentially may treat a subject less thoughtfully, more casually, and make statements in an e-mail that he or she would not in letters or memoranda. 155 These generalizations, however, do not apply in every case. For example, Weigel's February 12 e-mail appears to be a business communication made with an appropriate and normal degree of care.
156
The Connor court, applying the five-factor test adopted in the Eleventh Circuit, found that Sun Trust acted in bad faith and spoliated evidence when its employee, Weigel, failed to preserve the February 12 e-mail. 157 The first and (1) whether the plaintiff was prejudiced as a result of the destruction of evidence; (2) whether the prejudice could be cured; (3) the practical importance of the evidence; (4) whether the defendant acted in good or bad faith; and (5) the potential for abuse if the evidence was not excluded. fourth factors are the primary concerns for spoliation issues, as set forth in the Casebook.
158
The first factor-prejudice-occurs when an innocent party would have relied on relevant evidence to prove its case but for the absence of that evidence due to its destruction.
159
The court compared the direct, irrevocable prejudice in Flury with the more speculative prejudice at issue in Connor because the evidence in question was obtained eventually. 160 Although the court described the harm to Connor as "attenuated," it still found that she was prejudiced because the defendant's failure to produce or preserve the February 12 e-mail raised the concern that other relevant e-mails existed at the time, which similarly were not produced. 161 The court focused primarily on the fourth factor regarding the degree of culpability-whether Sun Trust acted in good or bad faith. 162 For this determination, the court balanced the bank's culpability against the prejudice to Connor, which are the primary factors of spoliation. 163 Although there was 158. See SCHEINDLIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 387 (explaining that the primary factors are prejudice and culpability). With regard to the three remaining factors, the court found that the second and third factors pulled in opposite directions and the fifth factor's potential for abuse was only slight. See Connor, 546 F. Supp. 2d at 1376-77. The contents of the February 12 e-mail had practical importance because it bore directly on the reasons for the plaintiff's termination. Id. The court found that the prejudice could be cured, but did not explain how. Id. In assessing the fifth factor, the court focused on whether the plaintiff had an adequate opportunity to discover the most reliable and relevant evidence in support of her claims. Id. at 1377. It found a slight potential for abuse because of the possibility that the defendant withheld other e-mails relating to the reasons for Connor's discharge. Id. Specifically, the court explained that the lack of other e-mails pertaining to Connor's termination could support the bank's case, and Connor did not have the ability to present conflicting evidence. Id.
159. Connor, 546 F. Supp. 2d at 1376. 160. Id. In Flury, a products-liability suit arising from the failure of an airbag to deploy, the plaintiff allowed the vehicle to be destroyed before the defendant could examine it. Flury, 427 F.3d at 940, 943. As a result, the defendant was irreversibly prejudiced because the most critical physical evidence was unavailable. no direct evidence of Weigel's intent, the court nevertheless found that she acted in bad faith because she knew the e-mail was relevant and either allowed it to be deleted automatically or affirmatively deleted it. 164 The court concluded that the bank was at least "minimally culpable," and combined with the prejudicial effect, rendered the bank sufficiently blameworthy to warrant imposition of an adverse-inference instruction. 165 
The Trigger Date: When the Duty to Preserve Arises
When should Sun Trust have reasonably anticipated litigation, thus triggering the duty to preserve the February 12 e-mail? At the latest, a firm-wide duty to preserve evidence attached on February 21, 2007, when Connor's attorney advised Sun Trust of the likelihood of litigation and requested that relevant documents be preserved. 166 The more difficult question is whether Sun Trust was subject to a duty to preserve the e-mail at the time it was sent or any time before receiving the demand letter. 167 The court did not address this question explicitly. Arguably, the bank's duty to preserve evidence triggered only upon Connor's attorney threatening suit on February 21. 168 The facts do not show that Connor indicated a potential suit before the demand letter. 169 Courts agree that the duty is triggered when litigation is reasonably anticipated, which may be before an action has commenced. 170 The Sedona 164. Id. Even if Weigel did not affirmatively delete the e-mail, it would have remained in her outbox for another twenty days from the day she was instructed to preserve information. Id.
165. Id. at 1377. The court also considered the actions of another employee, Sue Johnson, head of human resources, who received the February 12 e-mail but similarly did not produce it. Id. at 1368. The court did not focus on Johnson's actions in its spoliation analysis because of her custom to delete messages that did not require any further action on her part. Id. Assuming the e-mail required no response, had Johnson followed her usual practice, she would have deleted the e-mail immediately and it would not have been producible because the backup tapes would have been overwritten by the time of the preservation order. Id. The court may have found Johnson's actions less culpable than Weigel's because she was only a recipient of the e-mail, rather than its author, who supervised and decided to fire Connor. Id. 169. See id. at 3 ("[I]n virtually every case which has considered the issue, there has been at least some indication from the plaintiff that a suit was contemplated.").
170. See, e.g., Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271. F.3d 583, 591 (4th Cir. 2001) ("The duty to preserve evidence . . . extends to that period before the litigation when a party reasonably Conference stated that "[r]easonable anticipation of litigation arises when an organization is on notice of a credible probability that it will become involved in litigation or seriously contemplates initiating litigation."
171 Determining when this duty arises depends on particular facts and circumstances. 172 Admittedly, expecting every terminated employee to sue his or her former employer is unreasonable. Nonetheless, the discharge of employees soon after should know that the evidence may be relevant to anticipated litigation."); Lewy v. Remington Arms Co., 836 F. at 142, 145. The U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware found intentional spoliation and declared several of Rambus's patents unenforceable because the duty to preserve arose when the offender decided to implement a litigation strategy. Id. at 150-51. On substantially similar facts, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California denied Hynix declaratory relief, ruling that Rambus had not spoliated evidence because the destruction occurred before a duty to preserve arose. Hynix, 645 F.3d at 1342-45. In Micron, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court's ruling as to the relief granted but affirmed its spoliation finding. Micron, 645 F.3d at 1332. It stated that a trigger date depends on an "objective standard, asking not whether the party in fact reasonably foresaw litigation, but whether a reasonable party in the same factual circumstances would have reasonably foreseen litigation." Id. In Hynix, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court's spoliation finding, concluding that the lower court improperly required a finding of certain immediate litigation to trigger the preservation duty. Hynix, 645 F.3d at 1347. The Federal Circuit expressly rejected any requirement of imminency before a duty to preserve arises. Id. at 1345-46 ("It would be inequitable to allow a party to destroy documents it expects will be relevant in an expected future litigation, solely because contingencies exist, where the party destroying documents fully expects those contingencies to be resolved.").
171. Working Grp. I, supra note 33, at 269. 172. SCHEINDLIN ET AL., supra note 1, at 104. In its guidelines, Sedona described circumstances when the duty to preserve does not arise:
For example, a vague rumor or indefinite threat of litigation does not trigger the duty; nor does a threat of litigation that is not deemed to be reasonable or made in good faith. A lack of credibility may arise from the nature of the threat itself or from past experience regarding the type of threat, the person who made the threat, the legal basis upon which the threat is purportedly founded, or any of a number of similar facts. In addition, the trigger point for a small dispute, where the stakes are minor, might occur at a later point than for a dispute that is significant in terms of business risk or financial consequences. A reasoned analysis of all of the available facts and circumstances is necessary to conclude whether litigation or a government inquiry is or is not "reasonably anticipated." That determination is and should be made by an experienced person who can make a reasoned judgment. Working Grp. I, supra note 33, at 272 (footnote omitted).
they return from engaging in protected activity involves a significantly greater risk of litigation than terminating employees who have not engaged in such activity. 173 The risk of litigation is further heightened when the employee's claims are supported by credible evidence.
174
Although the court denied Connor's motion for summary judgment, it found that she had established a prima facie case of discriminatory retaliation and had presented evidence that Sun Trust's asserted reasons for her termination may have been pretextual. 175 
Relevance and Prejudice
The Connor court expressed its concerns that the defendant's failure to produce the February 12 e-mail could mean other relevant e-mails existed.
176
Because Connor eventually obtained the e-mail, the court could determine its relevance. 177 Unfortunately, other potentially relevant e-mails that may have existed when the duty to preserve arose would have been long deleted at that time-either automatically or by human hand.
178 Therefore, neither the parties nor the court had any way to determine whether other pertinent e-mails existed.
179 Instead, their existence and relevance is mere speculation.
180
One can reasonably infer the existence of other e-mails only after accepting the proposition that the existence of one relevant e-mail makes the existence of others probable. The strength of this proposition is not immediately obvious. This determination requires further detailed study to answer questions such as, "How often is the discharge of an employee or the elimination of a position the subject of multiple messages within a business organization?" Fortunately, courts recognize the unseemliness of insisting that a victim of spoliation show prejudice when the wrongdoer has deprived that victim of the ability to make such a showing. 181 Under certain circumstances, where the likely content of unavailable information cannot be determined, courts may presume its helpfulness to the innocent party or at least lower the bar for a finding of prejudice.
182
Although the court did not explicitly address presumptions in Connor, it appears to have presumed prejudice because the potentially relevant e-mails no longer existed. 183 The court's observation that other e-mails may have existed (and that those hypothetical e-mails may have been relevant) reduced the plaintiff's burden in showing prejudice.
184
The evidence also justifies the court's inference concerning the existence and the relevance of other e-mails. First, the plaintiff's supervisor sent the February 12 e-mail to members of the bank's senior management team. 185 Therefore, the critical e-mail would have been stored on several e-mail accounts-the supervisor's account and the account of each additional recipient.
186 Sun Trust Bank's failure to produce a copy of the e-mail from any source suggests at least gross negligence and, potentially, an actual conspiracy.
187 A conspiracy would implicate bad faith or willful behavior, as well as provide strong support for proving relevance because conspirators would not cover up irrelevant information.
Second, Weigel departed from her practice of archiving her e-mails during the period of time surrounding Connor's discharge. 188 A sharp departure from routine is naturally suspect, giving rise to an argument that documents lost during the aberrant period were relevant. Although not one of these factors alone provides sufficient evidence of bad faith or intent, they combine to support the trial court's finding that the potential loss of other relevant e-mails prejudiced Connor. 189 Notably, the court did not focus on the potential harm that could have resulted from the bank's failure to produce the February 12 e-mail if Connor had not come into possession of it through other means. A court could justify sanctioning discovery misconduct to punish and deter the behavior even though no injury resulted; however, courts generally agree that the specific sanction of an adverse-inference instruction must be justified by the impact of 
Rule 37(e): A Safe Harbor from Spoliation
Although the Connor court did not discuss the possible application of Rule 37(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, whether the rule's safe-harbor provision, which provides an exception to sanctions if the ESI was deleted in good faith, could have protected the defendant from sanctions presents an interesting issue. 191 Rule 37(e) would have afforded no protection to Sun Trust from sanctions if the plaintiff's supervisor intentionally deleted e-mails to avoid discovery. 192 The rule aims to protect parties unable to produce ESI lost as a result of the "routine, good-faith operation" of a computer system-not a loss caused by the act of an individual pursuing a litigation strategy. 193 The Advisory Committee noted that ESI may be deleted for legitimate reasons "that have nothing to do with how that information might relate to litigation," which creates a risk of losing relevant information through no fault of that party.
194
Could Sun Trust avail itself of Rule 37(e) if the critical e-mail were destroyed automatically after thirty days and not by an employee acting intentionally? The Advisory Committee note states that the safe-harbor provision applies to information that was deleted or altered because of the routine "good-faith" operation of the system that maintained that information. 195 Rule 37(e) does not define "good faith," but the Advisory Committee note states that good faith may require a party to intervene in the routine operation of an information system to preserve information subject to a preservation obligation. 196 The note clarifies that a party does not act in good faith if it "exploit[s] the routine operation of an information system to thwart discovery obligations by allowing that operation to continue in order to destroy specific stored information that it is required to preserve." the opinion does not explain if the bank altered or suspended its policy of automatically deleting all e-mails from the server after thirty days. 199 Thus, even if destruction of the critical e-mail occurred due to routine system operations, the safe-harbor exception would be unavailing. 200 Sun Trust had failed to act affirmatively to prevent the system from destroying discoverable information after a duty to preserve had attached. 201 Similarly, nothing in the opinion suggests that Sun Trust made any effort after February 22 to preserve the daily disaster-recovery backup tapes, which may have contained discoverable data. 202 Under the bank's policy, these tapes were retained for seven to ten days and then overwritten. 203 Ordinarily, backup tapes are considered to be not "reasonably accessible" because the process of restoring them is costly. 204 As such, the backup tapes might not be subject to a litigation hold. 205 But, if they were also used for information retrieval, they could be considered sources reasonably accessible that must be preserved. 206 Rule 37(e) does not address the preservation of sources that are not reasonably accessible and the Advisory Committee notes provide little guidance. 207 However, the notes also suggest that the party making the preservation decision on inaccessible sources ought to consider whether the information will likely be discoverable and whether it is otherwise available from reasonably accessible sources. 208 Such decisions are left to the parties, with little guidance from the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
V. WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
In early 2000, the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules began a process that resulted in the adoption in 2006 of new rules that specifically address the discovery of ESI. 209 The new discovery rules, however, do not focus on issues concerning the preservation of electronic data or sanctions for its spoliation.
210
Courts continue to be the primary source for the law in these areas. 211 The Advisory Committee on Civil Rules is now considering whether it should propose new rules governing preservation and sanctions for the spoliation of ESI 212 and recently directed its Discovery Subcommittee to evaluate the merits of a rule-based approach. 213 The Subcommittee thereafter met repeatedly to examine varying rule-based approaches and potential rule amendments. 214 In December 2011, the Advisory Committee requested that the Subcommittee recommend a course of action at the Advisory Committee meeting in March 2012. 215 After receiving the Committee's directive, the Subcommittee engaged the Federal Judicial Center to study motions in federal court for sanctions based on spoliation; the study found that such motions were relatively rare-especially in cases involving ESI. 216 It also commissioned Chief Counsel Andrea Kuperman's 104-page study on preservation and spoliation issues. 217 Further, the Subcommittee sought to educate itself on a rule-based approach to preservation and sanctions by obtaining insights from individuals and organizations knowledgeable in electronic discovery. 218 To that end, the Subcommittee conducted a "mini-conference" in Dallas in September 2011 attended by Subcommittee members, some members of the full Committee, and about twenty-five invited participants-including academics, technology experts, and representatives from the Department of Justice.
219
To foster discussion, the Subcommittee prepared and supplied attendees with a memorandum, which outlined three general categories of rule-based approaches to preservation and sanction. 220 The memorandum emphasized that the Subcommittee had not decided which of these three approaches it favored-or whether it favored a rule-based approach at all.
221
The memorandum expressed concerns with a rule-based approach to preservation. 222 First, it said that a rule purporting to regulate only pre-litigation preservation-a "front end" rule-might raise questions concerning the scope of rulemaking authority under the Rules Enabling Act, 220. Memo on Pres. & Sanction Issues, supra note 6, at 1-2. The draft rules for categories 1 and 2 addressed the preservation of ESI and included three common provisions: (1) a "general duty to preserve" provision requiring persons who "reasonably expect" to be a party to a federal action to preserve "discoverable" information if they become aware of certain facts or circumstances; (2) a provision that would excuse a compliant party from sanctions; and (3) a provision that would authorize courts to "employ" any Rule 37(b) sanction and to inform a jury of a failure to preserve information. Id. at 3-4, 14-16, 18, 20-21. The specificity of terms used in the draft rules distinguishes category 1 from category 2. Id. at 1. The draft category 1 rule identifies the specific digital data that ordinarily would need to be preserved. Id. at 3. Based on the idea that precise rules would provide bright-line guidance, the draft category 1 rule would also (1) identify the acts or events that triggered a duty to preserve; (2) list the kinds of information which, absent agreement or court order, could be "presumptively excluded from the preservation duty"; (3) limit the retroactivity of the duty; and (4) specify the number of custodians whose information must be included if they became aware of certain facts or circumstances. Id. at 4-11. The draft category 2 rule addresses preservation more generally. Id. at 18. It only lists the alternative acts or events that would trigger a duty to preserve. Id. at 18-20. It neither identifies the ESI required to be preserved, nor does it specify how long discoverable evidence should be preserved. Id. at 18-19. The Subcommittee also proposed a category 3 rule, which it referred to as a "back end" rule because it does not have any specific preservation provisions and would authorize sanctions only when a party did not "reasonably preserve." Id. at 22. The category 3 draft rule listed various factors for a court to consider-such as anticipation of litigation, use of a litigation hold, proportionality concerns, and whether a party sought timely guidance from the court. Id. at 22-24.
221. Id. at 2. 222. Id. at 1.
but that a "back end" sanctions rule might not. 223 Second, although the memorandum acknowledged that some preservation obligations might be costly or burdensome, it questioned whether rulemaking would solve those problems. 224 The mini-conference was highly successful. The views expressed were diverse and controversial. 225 The Advisory Committee's Report to the Standing Committee, dated December 2, 2011, summarized the overall discussion of various topics at the mini-conference. 226 For example, participants discussed the potential economic and reputational costs associated with the over-preservation of potentially discoverable information. 227 After the mini-conference, Subcommittee members discussed the event in two conference calls. 228 One participant argued that further development of case law would prove more effective at dealing with new situations than a rules-based approach. 229 Another participant offered the contrary view that in order to avoid sanctions, many corporations will engage in over-preservation-a problem that can only be solved by crafting a responsive rule. 230 The Subcommittee concluded the conference calls by agreeing to focus on developing a rule to regulate sanctions.
231
The Subcommittee expressed its preference for the category 3 approach following the mini-conference. 232 The Subcommittee agreed that a preservation rule would not be useful considering how difficult developing such a rule would be. 233 At the November 2011 meeting of the Advisory Committee, the Subcommittee sought direction from the full Committee, 234 ordered the Subcommittee to continue pursing all approaches and to report again in March 2012. 235 Any rulemaking proposal that the Advisory Committee might make will be processed under the Rules Enabling Act, which requires review by the Judicial Conference, the Supreme Court, and Congress. 236 The issues under consideration are controversial and the issuance of new rules could take years.
VI. CONCLUSION
For a host of reasons, Connor proved to be useful pedagogically because the spoliation of ESI, even in a garden-variety FMLA lawsuit, raised novel issues of fact, law, and policy. 237 First, the fact issues require complicated inquiries-not only of a party's computer-operations and document-management policies, but also whether, and to what degree, the human behavior that resulted in the destruction of ESI was culpable. Usually, as in Connor, the evidence of who did what, when, and why is only circumstantial; inferences must be drawn concerning the intentions or conduct of key players.
238 Second, the decision shows how spoliation can undermine litigation intended to vindicate public policies, such as those embodied in legislation regulating employment.
Third, Connor piqued student interest and stimulated classroom discussion because questions raised by the court's rulings and the underlying facts allowed differing perspectives. Class members disagreed, for example, over the level of Sun Trust's culpability, particularly concerning whether Weigel may have concealed the February 12 e-mail to harm Connor's case. 239 The class was also divided on the court's choice of a proper sanction. Students commented that a judge should select a sanction commensurate with the varying degrees of culpability and prejudice. Because class members generally agreed that the prejudice to the plaintiff was attenuated, no student suggested that the court grant the plaintiff summary judgment because of the spoliation. Although an adverse-inference instruction is itself a harsh sanction, most agreed that it was appropriate because they believed that Weigel intentionally deleted the e-mail, which deserves a deterrent. However, a few 
